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We examine the usefulness of the Expansionary Fiscal Contrac-
tion hypothesis in explaining the performance of the Irish and Danish
economies. We ￿nd some evidence in favour of a weak version of the
EFC hypotheisis: If the budget de￿cit is reduced in response to a ￿s-
cal crisis, consumption does seem to increase. However this increase
is not enough to oﬀset the direct eﬀe c to far e d u c t i o ni nt h ed e ￿cit on
output￿ ￿scal contractions are not literally expansionary.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The requirements for large ￿scal adjustments has become one of the most im-
portant themes in macroeconomic debates worldwide. The past two decades
have seen an unprecedented peace-time increase in public debt ratios and the
IMF (1996) has stressed the need for ￿scal consolidation in a wide range of
industrial countries. In Europe, discussions surrounding EMU have concen-
trated largely on the Maastricht budgetary requirements. In the US, there
is much discussion of balancing the federal budget and tackling entitlement
programs. Given this background, it is a good time to explore the hypothesis
put forward by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) that large ￿scal contractions can
potentially be expansionary.
Several diﬀerent, although related, theories have been advanced to explain
how ￿scal contractions may be expansionary. The ￿rst, which Giavazzi and
Pagano (henceforth, GP) call the ￿German view￿ of ￿scal policy, after Fels
and Froelich (1986), suggests that reductions in government spending can
be expansionary due to their eﬀects on private sector expectations concern-
ing taxation. If forward-looking consumers and investors anticipate long-run
tax reductions because of cuts in expenditure, then they may increase ex-
penditure now and so oﬀset the demand-side eﬀects of ￿scal contraction.
Blanchard (1990) proposed an extension to the basic EFC hypothesis: if
tax increases unexpectedly stabilize debt now and thus avoid a later, more
painful, stabilization involving larger increases then the change in expec-
tations could prove expansionary. Blanchard￿s model implies that such an
outcome is most likely to be seen when economies are ￿close to the edge￿
with high debt-GDP ratios.
As support for the ￿rst expansionary ￿scal contraction (EFC) theory,
GP (1990) present the experiences of Ireland and Denmark, both of which
combined severe ￿scal contraction with strong output performance. How-
ever, a common feature of these expansionary ￿scal contractions was a large
devaluation prior to the adjustment implying that it was possible that the
expansions were really due to increases in net exports. Furthermore, in a
further re￿nement of the EFC hypothesis, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997)
study a wide range of ￿scal adjustment experiences and ￿nd that the ad-
justment programs most likely to succeed in stabilizing debt levels are those
which cut expenditure. They indicate that such programs succeed not be-
cause they reduce de￿cits by more but rather because they lead to higher
growth.
Most the theories of EFC concentrate on explaining why consumption
might increase in response to a ￿scal contraction. This need not imply that
output is actually rising. So for example, following a cut in government
2consumption, private consumption may rise due to some EFC mechanism.
But it is quite possible, indeed likely, that this consumption eﬀect is not large
enough to oﬀset the direct eﬀect of the cut in government consumption so
that output falls.
The principal econometric evidence that has been put forward has taken
the form of consumption (or savings) function analyses. GP (1990) suggest
that the Irish and Danish stabilization were associated with large residuals
from estimated consumption and investment functions. GP (2000) perform
a multi-country analysis of consumption and indicate that if ￿scal actions
are large and persistent then ￿scal policy will have non-Keynesian eﬀects on
consumption.
This paper explores the empirical basis for EFC theories by focusing on
the experiences of Ireland and Denmark ￿ the two countries whose economic
performance during the 1980s lead to the formulation of EFC hypothesis.
We review the Irish and Danish evidence in the light of the more recent
experience. We focus on two speci￿c countries in contrast to most of the
recent literature which has tended to focus on pooled cross country and
panel data analysis. We believe our approach has the potential to capture
important country speci￿ce ﬀects which will be missed in panel data models.
Section two takes a ￿rst look at the Irish and Danish data. We assess
whether it is plausible to attribute the output performance during these
episodes to non-Keynesian eﬀects of ￿scal policy or whether other factors
oﬀset traditional Keynesian eﬀects. Section three takes a more formal ap-
proach by estimating country speci￿c savings function and testing several
diﬀerent versions of the EFC hypothesis. Section four concludes.
2A F i r s t L o o k a t t h e D a t a
2.1 The Irish Case
The recent performance of the Irish economy is illustrated in Figure 1.1
Broadly speaking the performance in the up the late 1980s was exceptionally
bad while performance throughout the 1990s was exceptionally good. The
turning point came in 1987, by this time the course of ￿scal policy had be-
come unsustainable and the Irish public ￿nances were in very serious trouble.
The debt-GDP ratio was nearly 120%, the budget de￿cit equalled 10.8% of
GDP. Growth was negative and the unemployment rate stood at 17%.
1The data for Figure 1 are from the IMF￿s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM
with the exception of the unemployment data which come from the OECD Economic
Outlook diskettes
3The election of a new government in early 1987 saw a shift in macroeco-
nomic policy. A sharp ￿scal contraction was introduced aimed at restoring
stability to the public ￿nances. A national wage agreement delivered wage
moderation was agreed and exchange rate policy, after an intra-EMS devalu-
ation in 1986, was aimed towards maintaining stability within the EMS. As
Figure 1 shows, the Irish ￿scal contraction featured substantial cuts in pub-
lic expenditure. By 1989, public expenditure was more than 10 percentage
points below its 1986 level as a share of GDP. Indeed, by 1989, these expen-
diture cuts had translated into a decline in the tax share of GDP despite the
large reduction in the de￿cit.
This period also saw stability relative to the DM which lead to a gradual
decline in the diﬀerential between Irish and German interest rates (although
the reduction in real interest rates was smaller). Furthermore, despite the
large ￿scal contraction, sustained growth resumed in 1987 for the ￿rst time
since the late 1970s and both the debt-GDP ratio and the unemployment
rate began to decline rapidly. By 1990, it was clear that the ￿scal crisis had
been averted and the Irish economy was experiencing unprecedented rates of
economic growth.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ee x t r e m e￿scal contraction of this period was accom-
panied by an impressive growth performance provides some evidence that
the ￿scal contraction was the cause of the economic expansion, although GP
also give the competitive eﬀects of the 1986 EMS devaluation some role in
their explanation. Furthermore, the fact that this stabilization was achieved
by expenditure cuts rather than by increases in taxation is consistent with
Alesina and Perotti (1996,1997).
The Irish experience appears at ￿rst glance to conform well to the ￿rst
EFC theory outlined above: the reductions in the expected tax burden as-
sociated with the ￿scal adjustment may have produced a positive response
from consumers and investors thus leading to strong economic growth. How-
ever, a closer inspection of the data revels that the evidence is not so clear.
Table 1 breaks down the growth in GDP into its expenditure components,
consumption (C), investment (I), government consumption expenditure (G),
exports (X) and imports (M). It also shows the contribution of each of these
components to overall growth in GDP (the numbers on the right-hand side
of the table add together to give growth in GDP). Thus table 1 describes
exactly where the sources of growth in the components of GDP came from
during the period around the 1987 stabilization.
The year 1987 was the ￿rst year of the stabilization program and also
the ￿rst year of the resumption of strong growth. Growth in Real GDP of
4.56% was made up of negative contributions of 0.2% from investment and
1.01% from government spending on goods and services; private consump-
4tion expenditures contributed 2.1% but growth in imports took 2.95% away.
Thus, domestic expenditure on domestic goods and services actually declined
(contributing negative 2.06% to growth) - the classic Keynesian outcome!
The data quickly reveal that the impressive growth in GDP was largely
driven by the performance of exports, which grew by 12.86%. Because of
the extreme openness of the Irish economy - in 1986 the sum of imports and
exports equalled 124% of GDP - this contributed a massive 6.24% to the
￿gure for GDP growth: had exports remained ￿at during 1987, there seems
to be little doubt that the Irish economy would have been in severe recession.
Subsequent years also tell the same story. Strong export growth continued
to stimulate the economy during 1988 and 1989. Investment remained ￿at
until 1989 and consumption growth was moderate given the overall growth
rate. Table 1 tells us that the picture of a domestic demand-driven boom in
Ireland is not the full story.
What caused the strong export performance? Undoubtedly one reason
was the fast growth in the UK.2 GP have focused on the role of exchange rate
policies in in￿uencing competitiveness, noting ￿it is remarkable that in both
our cases of ￿expansionary contractions￿ the shift in ￿scal and exchange rate
policy were preceded by a sizeable devaluation￿. In fact the nominal eﬀective
exchange did not depreciate by much during this period.3 However the real
eﬀective exchange rate measured by unit labour costs declined substantially.
This was due to sizeable gains in productivity and also the fact that wages
were restrained both by a national wage agreement and exceptionally high
unemployment.4 Thus, as the last panel of Figure 1 shows, the level of
competitiveness improved dramatically throughout the 1980s.
It would appear then that Ireland￿s ￿scal contraction was lucky enough
to come during a period in which its largest export market experienced very
strong growth, the establishment of credibility by joining the EMS reduced
real interest rates and output was well below potential levels depressing
wages. One can also note that, since the ￿scal adjustment, growth in Ireland
has averaged over 5% a year, well above the OECD average. This suggests
that the supply-side conditions for rapid growth were in place, something
which may not be true in other countries currently contemplating budgetary
2In 1987 the UK economy grew at 4.76% while in 1988 it grew at 4.98%, rates far above
its post-1973 average of 1.62%.
3The reason for this was that the substantial devaluation of punt within the EMS
during 1986 was oﬀset by the depreciation of Sterling against the DM.
4. Though such measures are obviously fairly speculative, OECD Economic Outlook
estimates the gap between actual and potential Irish GDP in 19 8 6t ob e5 . 2 %o fG D P .
For comparison purposes, the US output gap was 5.5% during the severe 1982 recession.
Such a depressed state of the economy would likely have encouraged competitiveness.
5adjustment.
2.2 The Danish Case
Figure 2 illustrates the recent performance of the Danish economy.5 Ab r i e f
summary of the facts concerning the Danish ￿scal contraction is as follows.
In 1982, Denmark￿s debt-GDP ratio was 65% and rising rapidly with a bud-
get de￿cit equal to 8% of GDP. A series of upward revisions of the public
sector de￿cit had lead to uncertainty in ￿nancial markets concerning the
sustainability of the Danish public ￿nances. The in￿ation rate had been re-
duced by less than in other EC countries and Danish exchange rate policy
had involved a number of devaluations during the previous years. Long-term
interest rates stood at 22% and the credit rating on Danish foreign debt had
been downgraded.
The election in October 1982 of a Conservative coalition lead to a turnaround
i nm a c r o e c o n o m i cp o l i c y .T h ep r o g r a mh a dm u c hi nc o m m o nw i t hi t sI r i s h
counterpart. There were three elements (OECD, 1984). Firstly, the new
government set out to reduce the budget de￿cit. Secondly, the currency was
roughly ￿xed to the DM within the EMS and exchange controls were re-
moved. Thirdly, an incomes policy was introduced in an attempt to tackle
in￿ation and help competitiveness. The ￿scal imbalance was tackled grad-
ually: the de￿cit was reduced to 6.7% of GDP during 1983 and had moved
into surplus by 1986. However, unlike the Irish experience, tax increases were
the principal tool in this ￿scal stabilization: tax rates were raised and the
tax base broadened. The result was a permanent upward movement in the
tax share of GDP as shown in the ￿rst panel of ￿gure 2. There was restraint
in public expenditure, leading to a decline in its share of GDP. However,
despite the ￿scal contraction the economy￿s growth was relatively strong:
growth averaged 3.6% between 1983 and 1986, fueled by strong domestic
demand.
GP (1990) argue that consumption increased despite the increase in taxes
because of a fall in interest rates. They also show that consumption was
higher than predicted during the years after the stabilization. However, this
consumption residual was small and even if it was completely due to ￿scal
contraction, it would have had a far smaller eﬀect on domestic demand than
the direct eﬀect of de￿cit reduction.
Like the Irish case, export growth was strong during the stabilization
despite moderate European growth during this period. Unlike the Irish case
5The data for Figure 2 are from the IMF￿s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM
with the exception of the unemployment data which come from the OECD Economic
Outlook diskettes.
6there was indeed a large devaluation in the eﬀective exchange rate during the
years prior to the adjustment. Curiously, however, when account is taken of
productivity, this translated into a real appreciation over the period of the
stabilization.
Table 2 (which replicates the calculations of Table 1 using the correspond-
ing Danish data) shows, there is evidence that domestic demand played a
larger role in the Danish expansion than it did in Ireland. For example in
1983, strong consumption growth contributed 1.3% to GDP growth. This
coupled, with near ￿at government consumption and a small rise in Invest-
ment and relatively slow import growth, overall domestic expenditure con-
tributed 1.12% to growth.
The reduction in real interest rates during this period also seems to have
played an important part in strengthening domestic demand during this pe-
riod. It also appears that the reduction in real interest rates was largely due
to shifts in exchange rate policy.
Thus, the Danish experience does not necessarily tell us that the ￿scal
contraction was expansionary in the sense of the EFC hypothesis i.e. that
private individuals increased current consumption in anticipation of lower
future taxes. Instead it seems that ￿scal stabilization combined with a cred-
ible monetary policy reduced interest rates which boosted consumption and
investment in a standard Keynesian fashion.
2.3 Summary
What emerges from looking closer at the examples EFC originally given by
GP is that in each of these cases there are several factors which may have
oﬀset the eﬀects of ￿scal policy to produce apparently non-Keynesian out-
comes ￿ only one of those factors being the EFC mechanism. The high
rate of economic growth accompanying the Irish stabilization was largely
driven by strong export performance which in turn was driven by wage re-
straint and productivity gains. Contrary to what we might expect during an
EFC episode, Irish domestic demand was relatively ￿at and failed to exhibit
non-Keynesian properties. The Danish stabilization, on the other hand, did
feature strong domestic demand but it is diﬃcult to unravel the separate
eﬀects of ￿scal and monetary policy during this period of falling real interest
rates.
Furthermore, despite the much-quoted statement that both Irish and
Danish stabilizations were preceded by large devaluations (see for instance
Alesina and Perotti (1995), IMF (1996, pg. 60)), the real eﬀective exchange
rate actually appreciated over the course of the Danish adjustment.
7So on the basis of a ￿rst look at the data the evidence for the EFC hy-
pothesis is actually quite week. There were clearly other factors at work also
and they were probably more important than the EFC mechanism. However,
just because it was not the dominant factor, does not imply that the EFC
was absent. In order to assess this we now turn to more formal econometric
evidence.
3 Econometric Evidence
3.1 Fiscal Policy and Savings
In this section we estimate a speci￿cation close to that of GP(2000), but
apply it separately to Irish and Danish data rather than to a cross section of
OECD countries. We do this because it is of interest to see whether Ireland
and Denmark, the two countries that sparked interest in EFC, still support
the hypothesis in its more recent formulations. More importantly a country
speci￿c study has an advantage in that it allows for coeﬃcients to diﬀer across
countries. Pooling data across countries may be inappropriate because of in-
stitutional diﬀerences across countries not captured by ￿xed eﬀects. There
is no reason to expect that the eﬀect of ￿scal policy on savings should be
the same or even similar in diﬀerent countries. Furthermore, this issue is
of particular importance when investigating the EFC hypothesis, precisely
because EFC are events that we suspect only in unusual times in certain
countries. The ￿average￿ coeﬃcients estimated from pooled data sets will
hide diﬀerences between countries with and without EFC. Of course estimat-
ing the relationship separately for diﬀerent countries has an obvious cost: the
consequent loss of degrees of freedom, may prevent us from identifying an
EFC eﬀe c ti fi ti ss m a l l .
We follow Giavazzi and Pagano (1996,2000) and estimate national sav-
ings and consumption regressions interacting the ￿scal variables with various
other variables that capture the potential for non-linear eﬀects. We allow
for possibly nonlinear eﬀects of ￿scal policy. For example, Blanchard (1990)
suggests that the EFC will be more likely to operate in times of ￿scal cri-
sis de￿ned as when the debt-GDP ratio reaches some critical level. The
literature also suggests6 that successful adjustments were more likely to con-
centrate on expenditure cuts and less likely to increase tax rates. In addition
expenditure-cutting adjustments have also be found to lead to a slight accel-
eration of growth after the adjustment in contrast to the decline in growth
6See Alesina and Perotti (1996), Perrotti (1997) for example.
8seen for other adjustments. For this reason we include taxes government
consumption and transfers as separate variables in some of the regressions
Before proceeding, we brie￿y review what the various theories predict
will be the eﬀect of ￿scal policy on savings.7 Broadly speaking the eﬀects of
taxes (T), transfers (TR) and government consumption (G)o ns a v i n g s( S)
will depend on the planning horizon of households and their expectations.8 In
a fully speci￿ed model of in￿nitely lived agents (or dynastic household with
bequests) ￿scal policy will have no eﬀect on national savings i.e. SG = ST =
STR = 0, where the subscript indicates the partial derivative. Any change
in the government￿s surplus will simply crowd out the savings of private
a g e n t sw h ok n o wt h a ti n c r e a s e si nt h es u r p l u st o d a yf a c i l i t a t ed e c r e a s e si n
the surplus at some point in the future.9 This is the well known case of
Ricardian Equivalence.
In ￿nite horizon models (e.g. Over-Lapping Generation models without
bequests) an increase in taxation will reduce the life time income of the
current generation leading to a reduction in private savings and consump-
tion. But because private agents pay some of the taxes via a reduction
in consumption, the increase in government savings exceeds the reduction
in private savings. Therefore national savings will rise (SG < 0,S T > 0,
STR = −ST < 0).
There is a third set of models (for convenience referred to as Expectations
Models) which predict that ￿scal policy can have perverse (perhaps even
non-linear) eﬀects on national savings. It is these models that provide the
theoretical rationale for EFC hypothesis. For example if the current ￿scal
de￿cit is unsustainable, savings may be very high in anticipation of a looming
￿nancial crisis which would lead to a decline in real living standards. In this
scenario any decrease in the de￿c i tt oa ne x t e n ts u ﬃcient to assure private
agents that a crisis has been averted, may cause them to reduce savings
and increase consumption. If this reduction in private sector precautionary
savings is large enough, it may dominate the increase in government savings
from the ￿scal consolodation and lead to a reduction in national savings
(SG > 0,S T < 0,S TR > 0). Thus the eﬀect of ￿scal policy on savings could
reverse sign in times of ￿nancial crisis.10
7National savings is de￿ned as the excess of Gross National Income over the sum of
private consumption and government consumption. For a comprehensive review of impact
of ￿scal policy on savings in diﬀerent models, see Giavazzi and Pagano (2000).
8S is National Savings S = Spriv + Spub ≡ (Y − T − C)+( T − G) ≡ Y − C − G
9This is true to a ￿rst approximation, ￿scal policy can still have an eﬀect if taxes are
distortionary.
10The exact de￿nition of ￿nacial crisis varies from model to model. For example, Blan-
chard (1990) thinks of a crisis occurring when Dbet-GDP reaches a critical level. Alesina
9In these models we get the apparently perverse result that an increase in
the government budget surplus can reduce national savings. Thus if we ￿nd
evidence that sign of the eﬀect of ￿sacl policy does reverse, then we will have
evidence of the existence of mechanism for EFC.
However it is important to note that the presence of a EFC eﬀect for
consumption (or savings) does not necessarily imply that a ￿scal contraction
will lead to an expansion of output. In order for a ￿scal consolodation to
be expansionary in the sense of increasing output the eﬀect on consumption
(savings) must not only be positive (negative) but suﬃciently large so as to
dominate the direct eﬀect of the contraction on GDP. To be clear, let θ be
the direct eﬀect of government consumption (G) on private consumption (C).
Normally we would expect θ = 0 i.e. once we control for income, government
expenditure has no eﬀect on private consumption. The eﬀect of G on National
Savings, S,i sg i v e nb y−(1 + θ). In most estimated models where evidence
of EFC is found (See GP 2000) the estimates of θ fall in the range −1 <
θ < 0 generating the perverse eﬀect of G on C or S. However, the output
multiplier has the same sign as (1 + θ) and so still has an orthodox positive
sign albeit smaller in magnitude.11 In order to have a ￿scal contraction
that actually leads to an expansion in output we must have θ < −1o r
equivalently SG > 0. It is worth noting that none of the coeﬃcients estimated
in GP1(1996,2000) are large enough to generate a negative multiplier. In fact
the term ￿Expansionary Fiscal Contraction￿ seems to have come to refer to
the eﬀect on consumption rather than the net eﬀect on output.
In the following subsections we estimate savings functions for Ireland and
Denmark. Our speci￿cation nests the three sets of models discussed above
and follows GP (2000). Our analysis diﬀers from theirs in that we use data
from International Financial Statistics CD ROM rather than OECD as the
former is available for a longer period ￿ and degrees of freedom are crucial
in a country speci￿cs t u d y . 12 Table 3 reports the exact series used and the
transformations of the data.
3.2 Ireland
Table 4 shows regressions of the national savings rate on its lag, the output
gap the real interest rate, government consumption and taxes net of transfers
and Perrotti (1996) think of a crisis being singnled by large changes in the de￿cit.




12For Ireland the full set of variables from the OECD database is available for the period
1977-97. For Denmark the OECD data begins in 1981. The IFS data is available from
1960. The data on Irish national debt is taken from the Irish Government￿s National
Treasury Management Agency Website: www.ntma.ie
10and various interations. The lagged savings rate is expected to capture the
dynamics of the system. The output gap variable accounts for the eﬀect of
transitory changes in income on national saving. All the variables (except
real interest rate) are scaled by potential GDP so as to be in units consistent
with Giavazzi and Pagano (2000).13 Note that the variables are not in logs.
The interaction terms capture the possibility that ￿scal policy may have
non-linear eﬀects on savings.
One problem with these estimates is that they do not account for poten-
tial endogeneity of the tax rate. While government consumption is likely to
be exogenous the level of taxes and the level of transfers are likely to respond
to the overall state of the economy via automatic stablizers and also via de-
liberate changes in government policy in response to the economic situation.
In order to overcome this problem we estimated the savings function instru-
menting using lagged values of the variables and a measure of the cyclically
adjusted ￿scal surplus calculated by the OECD. The resulting point esti-
mates were similar to those presented in table 4, but unfortunately none
were signi￿cant. We feel that this lack of signi￿cance is mostly an artifact of
the lack of observations.14 Furthermore Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) report
that their estimates are not very robust to alternative sets of instruments.
Therefore we do not report the results of the IV estimation.
The ￿rst column of table 4 reports the results of the basic regression with-
out any interaction eﬀects, estimated by OLS on the Irish data. The results
are broadly consistent with Giavazzi and Pagano (2000). The estimate of the
eﬀect of the lagged savings rate con￿rms their result that the long run eﬀect
of savings determinants are approximately twice the short run eﬀects. The
estimate of the eﬀect of the output gap is correctly signed, but insigni￿cant.
As we would expect temporary increases in GDP relative to potential GDP
tend to raise both public and private savings. The point estimate of the eﬀect
of net taxes on national savings is very close to theirs (although here it is
insigni￿cant). However, the eﬀect of government consumption expenditure
is much less negative here (−0.34 against −0.73) and this diﬀerence is sig-
ni￿cant. This is interesting because a negative coeﬃcient is what we would
expect from an orthodox ￿nite horizon model. So it appears that Ireland,
while conforming to the ￿n i t eh o r i z o nm o d e l ,d o e ss ot oal e s s e re x t e n tt h a n
the rest of the OECD. This suggests that the expectations mechanism may
operate in Ireland to a greater extent than it does in the OECD on aver-
13Potential GDP is de￿ned as GDP passed through a Holdrick-Prescott Filter. Giavazzi
and Pagano (2000) used the OECD￿s potential ouput series, which is virtually indistin-
guishable from ours.
14In particular the OECD￿s measure of the cyclically adjust budget surplus is only
available for 20 years.
11age. Note that this result is obtained without explicitly isolating those crisis
episodes where the expectations hypothesis would be expected to dominate.
There is a danger that a regression such as that in column one of Table
4 could be inconsistent due to the presence of unit roots in several of the
variables. Giavazzi and Pagano (2000) maintain that the lagged savings
term is suﬃcient to account for the dynamics of the system, while in their
1996 paper they include lags of the ￿scal policy variables. Including lags
here results in all coeﬃcients being insigni￿cant almost certainly because of
the loss in degrees of freedom. Alternatively we estimate the equation with
all variables replaced by their ￿rst diﬀerences. In the interest of brevity the
results are not shown, but are not substantially diﬀerent from the regression
in level terms.15
The other regressions in table 4 allow us to test the hypothesis that the re-
lationship between savings and the ￿scal policy variables is diﬀerent in times
of crisis. In the second column we examine the possibility that the eﬀect of
￿scal variables is diﬀerent during periods of large adjustment.16 The ￿rst
thing to note is that the coeﬃcients on the interacting term are insigni￿cant.
However, this is not the end of the story. The inclusion of the interaction
terms allows the eﬀect of taxes in ordinary times to become positive, sig-
ni￿cant and close to that estimated by Giavazzi and Pagano (2000). This
suggests that, in normal times, net taxes have an entirely orthodox ￿￿nite
horizon￿ eﬀect on savings. But outside of normal times the magnitude of this
eﬀect is reduced to some extent. Thus when we fail to distinguish between
normal and crisis times, as in column one, we get an eﬀect statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. We cannot get an accurate measure of the eﬀect of
large stabilizations directly because we do not have enough observations of
crisis periods, but nonetheless we can verify its presence. Thus we have some
evidence of non-linear eﬀects of ￿scal policy induced by the expectations.
There is therefore some support from the Irish data for the EFC hypothesis.
But note that there is no evidence to suggest that the output multipliers are
negative i.e. SG is not positive.
The third column of table 4 examines the possibility that the eﬀect of
the ￿scal policy varies with the level of debt. We might expect that at low
15A ￿rst diﬀerence speci￿cation would lead to inconsistent estimates if there was a con-
integrating relationship between the variables. A Johansen test does not allow us reject
(at the 5% signi￿cance level) the null that there is at least one co-integrating vector. An
Error Correction Model produces coeﬃcients on ￿scal policy variables not signi￿cantly
diﬀerent from Table 4.
16We adopt a similar approach to Alesina and Perotti (1996) and de￿ne a large adjust-
ment to be a change in the cyclically adjusted budget de￿cit greater than 1.5% of GDP.
For Ireland these adjustments occurred in 1984 and 1987-89.
12level of debt the orthodox ￿nite horizon model may apply. But when debt
reach crisis levels, the expectations model dominates, agents cast a wary eye
on the future and respond to anything that may stabilize the situation with
a reduction in (precautionary) savings. In order to examine this possibility,
we interact the ratio of debt to potential GDP with the two ￿scal policy
variables.
The results are quite striking, indicating that the eﬀect of ￿scal policy
is highly non linear. The interaction terms are signi￿cant as are the level
terms. In order to clarify the eﬀect of ￿scal policy consider two scenarios:
A low debt scenario (where debt is 25 percent of potential GDP) and high
debt scenario (where debt is 85 percent of potential GDP).17 During periods
o fl o wd e b t ,i n c r e a s e si nn e tt a x e sl e a dt oa ni n c r e a s ei nt h es a v i n g sr a t eo f
(1.23−0.25∗2.1) = 0.71 exactly as we would expect from the ￿nite horizon
model. During periods of high debt, however, increases in net taxes have a
large negative (1.23 − 0.85 ∗ 2.1=−0.55) eﬀect on the savings rate. This is
not what we would expect under the normal ￿nite horizon model, but it is
what we would expect to see during expansionary ￿scal contractions driven
by the expectations model. When it seems that a government is tackling the
debt crisis by increasing taxes, private agents feel secure in increasing their
consumption and reducing their savings.
The eﬀect of government consumption expenditure is less clear cut. It is
tempting to cite the positive coeﬃcient on the level eﬀect as evidence of a
negative multiplier ￿ but this would be true only when debt is zero. In the
low debt scenario the net eﬀect of an increase in government consumption
is to reduce national savings by (0.91 − 0.25 ∗ 4.1) = −0.12. Again this is
exactly what we would expect from a standard ￿nite horizon model. In the
high debt environment the eﬀect of an increase in government consumption
is much larger at (0.91 − 0.85 ∗ 4.1) = −2.58. This is a curious result. We
might expected that an increase in government consumption during times
of ￿scal crisis would aggravate the crisis, inducing private agents to increase
their precautionary savings (or at least reduce their savings by less than they
w o u l di no r d i n a r yt i m e s ) .I n s t e a dw e￿nd precisely the opposite.18
T h ef a c tt h a tw eg e tan e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on government consumption
during times of high debt coupled with the fact that the coeﬃcient on gov-
ernment consumption in column 2 of table 4 was unaﬀected by the inclusion
of interaction terms suggest that individuals focus on taxes when deciding
17The ratio of Debt to potential GDP in Ireland was 25 percent in 1979 and 85 per cent
in 1987. These dates can be regarded, respectively, as being the start of down turn, and
the begining of the up-turn in the economy.
18Strictly speaking it is possible for private savings to rise and national savings to fall
because of the reduction in the government￿s surplus. But that doesn￿t seem very likely.
13on consumption plans. This is not entirely consistent with the a strict in-
terpretation of EFC hypothesis. Government consumption is taken to imply
future taxes, so individuals should react to large changes in it. This result, is
however, consistent with the observations of Alesina and Perotti (1995,1997).
They noticed that the more successful stabilizations tended to be based on
cuts in transfers (here included in ￿net taxes￿). If this is true we would ex-
pect to see a greater eﬀect from a big change in taxes rather than from a big
change in government consumption.
In order to examine this issue further we separate net taxes into its two
components: gross taxes and transfers. Thus government consumption and
transfers together account for what non-economists would consider as gov-
ernment expenditure. Economic theory would suggest that agents should
treat transfers as negative taxes and so the two variables should enter with
coeﬃcients of the same magnitude but opposite signs.
C o l u m n4o ft a b l e4s h o w st h er e s u l t so far e g r e s s i o nw i t ht h et w oc o m -
ponents of net taxes separated and interacted with the level of debt and a
dummy for large ￿scal adjustment. Column 4 shows that for their level ef-
fects taxes and transfers are indistinguishable being of the same magnitude
and of opposite signs ￿ as expected. The coeﬃc i e n to nt h et r a n s f e rv a r i a b l e
is also diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient on the government consumption variable
indicating that agents react diﬀerently to the two types of government expen-
diture, as we would expect.19 The interactions with the ￿large adjustment￿
variable are insigni￿cant with the exception of the gross tax variable. Thus
during large adjustments, the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei ng r o s st a x e so nn a t i o n a l
savings is negative (0.96−1.34 = −0.38) and signi￿cant whereas it is positive
during normal times (0.96). Again this provides some evidence for the EFC
hypothesis - an increase in taxes shows that the crisis is being dealt with and
leads to a reduction in precautionary savings.
We can also look at the eﬀect of the ￿scal variables during times of high
vs. low debt. The results are similar to those of column three. Increases
in government consumption cause savings to fall during times of low debt
and, curiously, even more so during times of high debt. Again there is no
evidence that the multiplier is negative for any historically observed level of
debt. The eﬀect of an increases in taxes is now no diﬀerent in times of high
debt than in times of low debt. The eﬀect of transfers does diﬀer between
high and low debt periods. A reduction in transfers during a period of low
debt will lead to a increase in savings (STR = −0.97+0.25∗1.83 = −0.51) as
predicted by a ￿nite horizon model where transfers are viewed as a negative
19A wald test of null hypothesis that both coeﬃcients are equal generates a p-value of
0.44.
14tax (STR = −ST < 0). During periods of high debt, however, a reduction in
transfers will lead to a decrease in savings (STR = −0.97+0.85∗1.83 = 0.59).
This is what we expect from the EFC hypothesis ￿ reductions in transfers
assures agents that the crisis is past and allows a reduction in precautionary
savings. Furthermore these results support the evidence accumulated by
Alesina and Perotti (1997) that stabilizations based on increases in gross
taxes tended to fail whereas those that cut transfer programmes seemed to
prove more credible and tended to be successful.
3.3 Denmark
The ￿rst column of table 5 reports the results of the basic regression without
any interaction eﬀects, estimated by OLS on the Danish data. As in the Irish
case, the results are broadly consistent with Giavazzi and Pagano (2000).
The estimate of the eﬀect of the lagged savings rate suggest that the long
run eﬀect of savings determinants are approximately ￿ve times the short run
eﬀects. The estimate of the eﬀect of the output gap is correctly signed, and
signi￿cant ￿ public and private savings rise in response to a positive shock to
GDP. The eﬀects of net taxes and government consumption expenditure on
national savings are not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero, although their point
estimates are consistent with the ￿nite horizon model. This insigni￿cance is
a little surprising given that Denmark was one of the two countries whose
experiences lead to the formulation of the EFC hypothesis.20
The other regressions in table 5 test the hypothesis that the relationship
between savings and the ￿scal policy variables is diﬀerent in times of crisis.
The second column examines the possibility that the eﬀect of ￿scal variables
is diﬀerent during periods of large adjustment (with ￿large￿ de￿ned as be-
fore).21 The ￿rst thing to note is that the coeﬃcients on the interacting term
are signi￿cant whereas the coeﬃcients on the level terms are not (although
they have the sign predicted by the ￿nite horizon model). This suggests that,
in normal times, net taxes and government consumption have entirely ortho-
dox ￿￿nite horizon￿ (or zero) eﬀects on savings. Outside of normal times the
sign of the eﬀect changes. Thus we have some evidence of non-linear eﬀects
of ￿scal policy induced by the expectations ￿ and some support from the
Danish data for the EFC hypothesis. In fact what is interesting is that in
crisis time the net eﬀect of increases in government consumption is positive
(SG = −0.24 + 0.38 = 0.14). This implies that the ￿scal policy multiplier is
negative during times of crisis.
20As in the Irish case, including lags of the ￿scal policy variables or estimating the
equation in ￿rst diﬀerences, has no substantial eﬀect on the results.
21For Denmark, large adjustments occurred in 1983-86.
15The third column of table 5 examines the possibility that the eﬀect of
the ￿scal policy varies with the level of debt. In contrast to Ireland, all the
￿scal policy variables and their interaction are insigni￿c a n t .T h i si sa l m o s t
certainly due to the fact that we only have 16 observations of debt available
for Denmark.
C o l u m n4o ft a b l e5s h o w st h er e s u l t so far e g r e s s i o nw i t ht h et w oc o m -
ponents of net taxes separated and interacted with a dummy for large ￿scal
adjustment. Column 4 shows that for their level eﬀects taxes and transfers
are insigni￿cant, but their point estimates are of the same magnitude and of
opposite signs ￿ as we would expect. As with Ireland, the interactions with
the ￿large adjustment￿ variable are insigni￿cant with the exception of the
gross tax variable. Thus during large adjustments, the eﬀect of an increase
in gross taxes on national savings is negative and signi￿cant whereas it seems
positive (or zero) during normal times.22
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we re-examined the Irish and Danish experiences for evidence
regarding EFC theories. The results are mixed. In Ireland we ￿nd evidence
in favour of a weak version of the EFC hypothesis ￿ consumption (or savings)
does seem to react to ￿scal policy in a manner predicted by the EFC hypoth-
esis. In particular during times of crisis, improvements in the governments
budget seem to cause private consumption to increase and private savings to
decrease. However, these eﬀects are not strong enough to overcome the direct
contractionary eﬀect of a reduced budget de￿cit. Thus the multiplier is not
negative and ￿scal contractions are not literally expansionary ￿ even in times
of crisis. We cannot escape the conclusion that the Irish boom was driven
largely by an export boom which itself was driven by rapid improvements in
competitiveness and growth in our main markets.
The Danish evidence is slightly stronger. We ￿nd evidence that con-
sumption and savings behave during crisis as the EFC hypothesis predicts.
Furthermore, the magnitudes of the eﬀect seem suﬃcient to justify the con-
clusion that the ￿scal multiplier is negative at least during times of crisis.
22Strictly speaking we cannot reject the null hypothesis that gross taxes have a negative
eﬀect on savings even in normal times (p − value =0 .135).
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17Table 1: Growth Rates During the Irish Fiscal Contraction
Growth Rates Contribution to Growth
1986 1987 1988 1989 1986 1987 1988 1989
Y -0.43 4.56 5.09 5.65 -0.43 4.56 5.09 5.65
C 1.99 3.27 4.39 6.31 1.29 2.1 2.8 4.05
I -2.83 -1.14 5.1 9.65 -0.53 -0.2 0.9 1.77
G 2.59 -4.97 -5.11 -1.28 0.58 -1.01 -0.94 -0.22
X 2.85 12.86 8.64 9.81 1.27 6.24 4.34 5.14
M 5.48 5.99 4.79 12.63 -2.66 -2.95 -2.35 -6.65
S t o c k s & ---- - 0 . 3 8 0 . 3 8 0 . 3 4 1 . 5 6
Discrepency
Table 2: Growth during the Danish Fiscal Contraction
Growth Rates Contribution to Growth
1982 1983 1984 1985 1982 1983 1984 1985
Y 2.97 2.49 4.3 4.2 2.97 2.49 4.3 4.2
C 1.44 2.55 3.32 4.85 0.73 1.3 1.68 2.46
G 3.03 -0.04 -0.41 2.49 0.88 -0.01 -0.11 0.66
I 6.84 1.83 12.12 11.83 1.21 0.32 2.31 2.43
X 2.47 4.74 3.41 4.84 0.74 1.45 1.03 1.48
M 3.71 1.74 5.31 7.79 -1.04 -0.49 -1.5 -2.27
D i s c r e p e n c y---- 0 . 4 5 - 0 . 0 8 0 . 8 9 - 0 . 5 6
18Table 3: Data
Variable De￿nition Source3& Construction Code
PC Private Consumption IFS 96F..ZF...
GC Government Consumption IFS 91F..ZF...
EXP Government Expenditure IFS 82...ZF...
SURP Government Surplus IFS 80...ZF...
Y Real GDP OECD EO GDPV
GNI Gross National Income IFS 99A..ZF...
Debt National Debt - Ireland NTMA1 -
National Debt - Denmark OECD EO2 GGFL
P Consumption Price De￿ator OECD EO PCP
LR Long Bond Yield OECD EO IRL
U Unemployment Rate OECD EO UNR
REER Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate IFS 65UM.ZF110
Y ∗ Potential GDP HP Filtered Y -
SR Short term Int. Rate IFS 60...ZF...
S National Savings (GNI − PC− GC)/(Y ∗ ∗ P)-
G Real Gov. Cons. (GC/(PY∗)) -
NT Net taxes (SURP + GC)/(Y ∗ ∗ P)-
GT Gross Taxes (SURP + EXP)/(Y ∗ ∗ P)-
TR Transfers (EXP − GC)/(Y ∗ ∗ P)-
D R a t i oo fD e b tt oP o t .G D P Debt/Y ∗ -
Rate Real Interest Rate SR− dlog(P)-
1. National Treasury Management Agency - www.ntma.ie
2. Only available since 1980
3. EO: OECD Economic Outlook. IFS: International Financial Statistics, IMF
19Table 4: Irish Savings Function
(1) (2) (3) (4)2
Lagged Saving Rate 0.63 0.58 0.09 -0.14
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12)
Output Gap 0.11 0.140 . 0 50 . 0 3
(0.14) (0.15) (0.11) (0.09)
Real Interest Rate/100 -0.13- 0 . 140 . 180 . 2 5
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
Gov. Consumption -0.35 -0.36 0.911 .56
(0.17) (0.17) (0.31) (0.52)
- and large adj. - -0.20 - 1.59
(0.21) (0.58)
- and high debt - - -4.1 -8.67
(1.11)( 1.62)
Taxes2 0.22 0.30 1.24 0.96
(0.14) (0.15) (0.28) (0.29)
- and large adj. -0.40 -1.34
(0.33) (0.58)
- and high debt - - -2.100 . 2 5
(0.55) (0.85)
Transfers - - - -0.97
(0.24)
- and large adj. - - - 0.70
(0.54)
- and high debt - - - 1.83
(0.46)
Debt ratio - - 0.71 0.71
(0.19) (0.17)
Adj. R2 0.66 0.69 0.83 0.92
1. Standard errors in parentheses
2. Taxes are net of transfers except in column 4 where they are gross
3. Sample is annual data from 1960 to 1997Table 5: Danish Savings Function
(1) (2) (3) (4)2
Lagged Saving Rate 0.85 0.82 0.65 0.81
(0.09) (0.11)( 0 . 16) (0.11)
Output Gap 0.31 0.31 0.81 0.33
(0.17) (0.17) (0.39) (0.18)
Real Interest Rate/100 0.24 0.28 0.53 0.26
(0.09) (0.09) (0.23) (0.10)
Gov. Consumption -0.12- 0 . 2 4- 5 . 6 2- 0 . 2 8
(0.14) (0.15) (6.48) (0.19)
- and large adj. - 0.38 - 0.66
(0.19) (0.76)
- and high debt - - 13.2 -
(11.2)
Taxes2 0.07 0.20 -0.130 . 19
(0.15) (0.16) (1.07) (0.17)
- and large adj. - -0.40 - -0.42
(0.20) (0.28)
- and high debt - - -0.09 -
(1.62)
Transfers - - - -0.13
(0.24)
- and large adj. - - - -0.03
(1.08)
- and high debt - - - -
Debt ratio - - -3.32 -
(2.99)
Adj. R2 0.87 0.86 0.92 0.84
1. Standard errors in parentheses
2. Taxes are net of transfers except in column 4 where they are gross
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Figure 2: The Danish Economy 1980-2000